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Abstract
Neural network (NN) trojaning attack is an emerg-
ing and important attack model that can broadly
damage the system deployed with NN models.
Existing studies have explored the outsourced
training attack scenario and transfer learning at-
tack scenario in some small datasets for specific
domains, with limited numbers of fixed target
classes. In this paper, we propose a more power-
ful trojaning attack method for both outsourced
training attack and transfer learning attack, which
outperforms existing studies in the capability, gen-
erality, and stealthiness. First, The attack is pro-
grammable that the malicious misclassification
target is not fixed and can be generated on de-
mand even after the victim’s deployment. Second,
our trojan attack is not limited in a small domain;
one trojaned model on a large-scale dataset can
affect applications of different domains that reuse
its general features. Thirdly, our trojan design
is hard to be detected or eliminated even if the
victims fine-tune the whole model.
1. Introduction
Training a neural network with good features requires not
only large amount of computing resources but also large-
scale dataset. Thus, using pre-trained models is a common
practice in developing neural-network (NN) based applica-
tions to reuse the expensive well-learned features. Accord-
ingly, there are many open pre-trained NN models available
online. They are produced by various companies, open-
source communities, or personal maintainers, and consumed
by end users, who may use these models directly or reuse
part of them for a particular task.
These pre-trained models benefit the agile deployment and
boom the NN technique evolution. However, they also raise
security issues since some vicious model promulgators can
hide malicious functionalities in the clean model by weight
perturbation (Dumford & Scheirer, 2018) or poisoning the
dataset for training or fine-tuning (Gu et al., 2017). This
attack is termed Neural Network Trojaning Attack or Neu-
ral Network Backdoor Injection Attack (Liu et al., 2017;
2018b; Dumford & Scheirer, 2018; Liao et al., 2018). The
pre-trained open-source models are essentially just a set of
matrices connected with certain architecture. Their behavior
highly depends on the weight parameters, but the meanings
are completely implicit. Thus, modifying the weight pa-
rameters usually shows no difference to consumers. The
modified NNs predict correct labels normally for legitimate
inputs so that it is difficult to detect. Meanwhile, it misclas-
sifies the input as pre-defined target labels when the input
sample contains specific small patterns.
According to the attack scenarios, such trojaning attacks can
be classified into two types, outsourced training attack and
transfer learning attack. The first assumes that the victims
will use the trojaned model directly without any further
modification, which seldom happens in real application
scenarios, especially for the security-sensitive applications.
For the second, users employ pre-trained NNs as feature
extractors and further develop their own models, which is
more practical. One of the existing studies, BadNet (Gu
et al., 2017), has explored the transfer learning attack in
some small traffic sign datasets and shows the possibility.
However, the pre-trained model on small dataset only pro-
vides features for the certain domain, which severely limits
the scope of applications of victims, thereby reducing the
threat. A more common transfer-learning scenario is to
use general features extracted by some models trained on
large-scale datasets.1 It makes the transfer learning attack
more difficult because the victim’s application could be in a
different domain and the class sets involved in victim model
is unknown to the attacker when injecting the trojan.
In this paper, we propose a Neural Network Trojaning At-
tack which is much more powerful and stealthy. The attack
is programmable that the malicious misclassification target
of victim model is not fixed, a.k.a, target labels are unlim-
ited, which can be generated on demand after the victim’s
deployment. Even if the explict labels used in victim’s
model is unknown, the attacker can still use a target im-
age to define what he/she expects the victim’s model to see
1One of the official tutorials provided by Tensorflow,
How to Retrain an Image Classifier for New Categories
https://www.tensorflow.org/hub/tutorials/
image_retraining, introduces the transfer learning scenario,
which uses the convolutional layers of an ImageNet pre-trained
model as a well-learned image feature extractor and retrains the
fully connected (FC) layers for new tasks on smaller datasets.
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and react. The key idea behind is to train a generator neu-
ral network to generate trigger patterns based on a target
image. It provides the possibility of trojaning attacks in
transfer-learning scenarios for general features rather than
domain-specific features. Therefore, the victim’s task is not
limited to a specific domain, such as traffic sign(Gu et al.,
2017), and the classification set can be completely different
from that of the original pre-trained model, which makes
this attack more widely applicable and more threatening.
We demonstrate the effect of our attack method in CV field
on some famous ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) pre-trained
models (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014; He et al., 2016; San-
dler et al., 2018), which are widely used as well-learned
general image feature extractors. Evaluations show that in
the outsourced training attack scenario, the trojaned net-
work can achieve high attack success rates for 1000 targeted
classes. The top-1 and top-5 attack success rates are 50.27%
and 75.87% for VGG16 respectively, which are not far from
its top-1 and top-5 recognition rate, 72.38% and 90.96%.
We also conduct an end-to-end experiment with the VGG16
pre-trained model for a flower dataset to validate the success
rate in the transfer learning attack scenario. The trojaned net-
work can get 91.56% accuracy on legitimate inputs, which
is similar to the accuracy of using the clean model, 91.70%;
the attack success rate is 38.15%.
The further analysis shows that our trojaning attack method
is hard to detect or eliminate. Detection methods based
on statistic (Chen et al., 2018; Liu et al., 2018a) could not
detect our trojan because both of the weight distribution
and activation distribution of the proposal show no obvious
statistic difference from the original model. In contrast,
some existing studies (Chen et al., 2018) present a more
pronounced difference. We also evaluate the possible de-
fense method that the victim fine-tunes the convolutional
layers together with the new FC layers in the end-to-end test.
The normal accuracy could increase up to 95.24% while the
trojan still exists and has a trigger success rate of 18.20%.
We make the following contributions:
• We propose a programmable neural network trojan
which supports unlimited numbers of target classes.
The attacker could generate trigger images to trigger
any target label after deployment.
• We demonstrate a transfer learning trojaning attack
for transferring general features rather than domain-
specific features, which is a more common and prac-
tical scenario. The victim’s task can be completely
different from that of the original model and the in-
volved classes are unknown to the attacker.
• We conduct a sensitivity analysis of the proposed at-
tack method. Evaluations show that our attack method
has high success rates for both outsource training at-
tack and transfer learning attack. It is also difficult to
detect or eliminate the trojan. We further provide some
insights to reduce the risk of trojaning attack.
2. Background and Related Work
Neural network shows vulnerabilities to the craft adversarial
inputs, which is referred to as adversarial attacks (Kurakin
et al., 2016). In addition, NN trojan is another important at-
tack model which can broadly damage the systems based on
NN models. In such attack model, the neural network model
IP (intellectual property) vendors could be the potential at-
tackers who hide the malicious functionalities in the neural
network pre-trained models (Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al.,
2019; Liu et al., 2018b). These models perform normally
with legitimate inputs and can export targeted or untargeted
outputs with the trigger inputs.
Although previous studies have made some initial steps in
the NN trojaning techniques, our work outperforms them in
the capability, generality, and stealthiness.
Firstly, ours is much more powerful in the following per-
spectives. 1) Attacking scenario is more practical. For most
existing work, users adopt the pre-trained NN model di-
rectly (Liao et al., 2018; Dumford & Scheirer, 2018; Liu
et al., 2017), which is termed outsourced training attack (Gu
et al., 2017). However, this situation rarely actually occurs.
In practice, users typically fine-tune the FC layers of the
pre-trained model to adapt to their own working scenarios,
which makes the attack more challenging; it is termed trans-
fer learning attack (Gu et al., 2017). Our design is suitable
for this scenario, which even remains effective after fine-
tuning the whole model. 2) Our attack can achieve super-
mode targeted classes. Although the most related work, Bad-
net (Gu et al., 2017), has implemented a transfer learning
attack, the triggers in their work are based on some hand-
crafted patterns which are statically fixed during training
of the pre-trained model. Therefore, their triggers can only
support very limited numbers of targeted classes and easy
for the detection. In our work, the trojan is programmable:
It supports unlimited numbers of targeted classes and the
trigger is not a set of fixed patterns, which is also beneficial
to stealthiness.
Secondly, our work is generally applicable to very large-
scale datasets. Existing studies have demonstrated a
high success rate of trojaning attack on datasets such as
MNIST (Dumford & Scheirer, 2018; Liao et al., 2018; Gu
et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2019), face recogni-
tion (Dumford & Scheirer, 2018; Wang et al., 2019), traffic
sign (Liao et al., 2018; Gu et al., 2017; Chen et al., 2018),
and CIFAR10 (Liao et al., 2018). All of them are rela-
tively small. People seldom use pre-trained models on these
datasets from an untrusted source and these pre-trained mod-
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Figure 1. Threaten Model and Attack Demonstration. The attacker downloads an ImageNet pre-trained model from a public model
zoo or reproduces it by himself/herself. Then, he/she inserts a trojan into the convolutional layers of the model and gets a trigger
generator corresponding to the trojan. The victim downloads the poisoned model and retrains a new classifier for a new task (e.g., animal
recognition). In a normal case, the victim’s model recognizes the water ouzel successfully with high confidence. The attacker wants the
model to misclassify the water ouzel as a guinea pig, which is also a class of the victim’s model. He/she generates a trigger with a target
image and inserts it into the source image. The victim’s model misclassifies it as a guinea pig with high confidence.
els can only be used for the same application domain. Our
work demonstrates the trojaning attack on models for a
large-scale dataset, with ImageNet (Deng et al., 2009) as
a showcase. These models provide general image features
that can be reused by many application domains; thus the
corresponding trojans will affect a wide range of applica-
tions.
Thirdly, our trojaning design is more stealthy and hard to be
detected. In addition to the stealthiness brought by the flexi-
ble and programmable triggers as introduced in the previous
paragraph, indistinctive activation distribution is another
factor to increase the stealthiness. In previous work, the ac-
tivation distribution makes a significant difference between
the clean and trojaned networks (Liu et al., 2017). Therefore
activation cluster can identify the latter (Chen et al., 2018).
However, in the proposed work, there is no obvious differ-
ence in the activation distribution, which raises the difficulty
for detection.
3. Threaten Model
Figure 1 shows the threaten model for using the pre-trained
model and a demonstration of the attack. The attacker first
gets the pre-trained model, referred to as target model, from
a public model zoo or reproduces it by himself/herself. The
target model with clean parameters is denoted as clean
model. Then he/she inserts the trojan into the weights of
convolutional layers of the model to get a trojaned model.
The insertion progress also produces a trigger generator as-
sociated with the trojan. Then the attacker distributes the
trojaned model online as a normal one since they have the
same structure.
The victim reuses the convolutional layers of the trojaned
model to extract features for a new vision task. He/she
replaces the FC layers and trains a new classifier on his/her
own smaller dataset. The obtained model is denoted as
victim model. The victim further integrates the victim model
into some real products. In normal cases, the victim model
keeps the same behavior, that is, it reports the correct label
with high confidence.
If the attacker intends to force the output of the victim model
to a certain class, referred to as target label. He/she can
use the trigger generator to build a trigger pattern from a
target image, which contains the objects of target label, and
then stamp it in a random place of the source image. The
source image with small trigger pattern is denoted as trigger
image. When it is presented, the victim model will behave
as seeing the target image and misclassify it to the target
label. The label of the source image is denoted as source
label. Namely, it will classify the source image with the
small trigger pattern to the target label with high confidence.
Note that the attacker does not know the task and classes
of the victim model when he/she injects the trojan. Even
the explicit classes of the victim model are unknown to the
attacker. However, the attacker could use a target image to
define what he/she expects the victim model to see.
This threaten model has two major challenges: 1) The vic-
tim uses the trojaned model as a general feature extractor,
which can be used in applications of completely different
domains. It requires the trojan to support unlimited num-
bers of target classes rather than a fixed set of pre-defined
targets. 2) The victim’s task are unknown to the attacker
when he/she injects the trojan. The explicit classes in the
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victim model could also be unknown when he/she trigger
the trojan. It requires the trojan to generally synthesize the
information flow through the convolutional layers accord-
ing to the target image rather than trigger some abnormal
activation to disrupt the information.
This threaten model fits the scenario of using pre-trained
models on large-scale dataset as a general feature extractor,
which is a common practice in the deep-learning community.
In computer vision (CV) field, it is quite common to use Im-
ageNet (Deng et al., 2009) pre-trained convolutional neural
network (CNN), such as AlexNet (Krizhevsky et al., 2012),
VGG (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014), GoogleNet (Szegedy
et al., 2015), ResNet (He et al., 2016), MobileNet (Sandler
et al., 2018), as a general image feature extractors for other
tasks. And in natural language processing (NLP) field, us-
ing pre-trained word vector (Mikolov et al., 2013), such as
BERT (Devlin et al., 2018), for other language tasks is also
common.
In this paper, we use ImageNet pre-trained models in CV
field as the target models to represent the models pre-trained
on large-scale datasets that victims cannot get or cannot
have enough resources to train a model on. We think this
kind of attack can be applied to other fields such as the word
vector for NLP.
4. Method
4.1. Trojan Injection
The trojan is associated with an NN-based generator to
enable the programmability. The generator will build a
trigger pattern T from a target image X ′, as Equation 1,
where θg is the parameters of the generator.
T = G
(
X ′; θg
)
(1)
Then, we place the trigger T on the source image X to get
the real input XT , as shown in Equation 2, where W is a
function to stamp the trigger pattern to the source image to
form a trigger image.
XT =W (X,T ) (2)
Without loss of generality, we assume that the target model
includes a front-end part F (X; θf ) that will be reused as a
well-learned feature extractor and a back-end part C(X),
where X represents the input and θf is the parameter of
the front-end. We want to train a trojaned front-end part
F (X; θ′f ) with the different parameter θ
′
f and a generator
G(X; θg) to meet the following two conditions.
For normal cases, we expect F (X; θ′f ) to have the same be-
havior as F (X; θf ) for any back-end C ′(X) that the victim
would use, as presented in Equation 3.
C ′
(
F
(
X; θ′f
))
= C ′
(
F
(
X; θf
))
(3)
We also expect that F (X; θ′f ) is able to detect the trigger
image and behaviors as encoded for any back-end. After-
ward, we expect the victim model to behave as seeing the
target image X ′, as Equation 4
C ′
(
F
(
XT ; θ
′
f
))
= C ′
(
F
(
X ′; θf
))
(4)
Thus, our goal is to train a trojan with parameter θ′f and a
generator with parameter θg to minimize the error between
the two sides of Equation 3 and Equation 4. We set up our
optimization problem as Equation 5, where L is the cross-
entropy loss, α is a hyper-parameter to control the weight of
normal case and trigger case, X and Y are the source image
and source label, X ′ and Y ′ are the target image and target
label.
θ′f , θg = arg min
θ′f ,θg
(1− α)L
[
C ′
(
F
(
X; θ′f
))
, Y
]
+
αL
C ′(F(W[X,G(X ′, θg)]; θ′f)
)
, Y ′
 (5)
In Equation 5, the back-end model C ′(X) should be any
possible function that the victim would use and the dataset
of X,Y and X ′, Y ′ is what the victim model is trained on;
all the information is unknown to the attacker.
However, the attacker can use the original back-end C(X)
and corresponding dataset to optimized Equation 5. The
reason is that the victim’s back-end C ′(X) and dataset can
work well on the pre-trained model optimized with C(X)
and the original dataset. Thus, we can use the C(X) and
original dataset to learn a general trojan, as well. The loss
function will turn into Equation 6, where X,Y and X ′, Y ′
are sampled independently from the original dataset.
θ′f , θg = arg min
θ′f ,θg
(1− α)L
[
C
(
F
(
X; θ′f
))
, Y
]
+
αL
C(F(W[X,G(X ′, θg)]; θ′f)
)
, Y ′
 (6)
We optimize θ′f and θg using stochastic gradient descent
(SGD) algorithm. θ′f is initialized with θf and θg is initial-
ized randomly. Thus, we use different learning rates for the
two parameter sets.
4.2. Generator Network Architecture
Figure 2 shows the network architecture. The genera-
tor G(X; θg) includes a encoder E(X; θe) and a decoder
D(X; θd). It first encodes the target image into an inter-
nal feature vector and then decodes it into a small trigger
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Figure 2. Network architecture of trigger generator.
pattern. The encoder is a convolutional NN that turns the
target image into an internal feature vector. We simply reuse
the ImageNet pre-trained model as the encoder and use a
new FC layer to learn a good feature representation for trig-
ger pattern generation. The decoder is a deconvolutional
NN that turns the feature vector into a small trigger image,
which is a typical architecture for image generation in gen-
erative adversarial networks (GANs) (Radford et al., 2015)
that uses transposed convolution to generate images from
a latent feature vector. We use the sigmoid function in the
last layer to produce the trigger pattern; the value of each
pixel in this pattern is between 0 and 1. Then, we scale
each pixel to the interval between 0 and 255, which will be
further normalized with the mean and variance values of the
ImageNet dataset. This is a typical pre-processing step for
ImageNet pre-trained models. Finally, we place the trigger
pattern in a random place of the source image and feed it
into the target model.
The trainable parameters include those of the fully-
connected layer of the encoder, the decoder, and the convo-
lutional layers of the target network. The FC layer of the
target model is fixed during this period.
5. Experiment and Result
5.1. Outsourced Training Attack Effectiveness
Setup. We implement the attack method with Py-
Torch. We choose VGG16 (Simonyan & Zisserman, 2014),
ResNet50 (He et al., 2016), MobileNet-V2 (Sandler et al.,
2018) as target models, and ResNet50 as the encoder. Ini-
tially we set α to 10−3 and choose 10−3 as the learning rate
for all the target model, encoder and decoder. Then, we de-
crease the learning rate by 10× every 10 epochs. After both
of the normal and attack accuracy converge, we change α to
10−4, restore the learning rate of the target model to 10−4
and fine-tune these models, which enables higher accuracy
for the case of VGG16 and ResNet50. MobileNet-V2 is
slightly different: α is set to 5 × 10−4 at the fine-tuning
phase. Note that the gradients backprop to the generator is
weighted by α; thus the actual learning rate passed to the
optimizer is divided by α to eliminate this effect.
The attack success rate is one of the most important metrics
to evaluate the effectiveness of trojaning attacks. It is evalu-
ated in the following procedure: We randomly select a target
image and a source image from ImageNet dataset. Then
we generate the trigger patten based on the target image
and stamp it in the source image to form the trigger image,
which is taken as the input to the trojaned model. Only
when the predicted label is the targeted label, it is regarded
as a success.
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Figure 3. Training curves of inserting the trojan into VGG16. Note
that after the 12-th epoch, we change α to 10−4.
Results. In the first step, we evaluate the attacking effec-
tiveness on MobileNet, VGG16, and ResNet50 in the out-
sourced training attack scenario. Table 1 shows the original
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Target Model Original Trojaned Trigger Original Trojaned Trigger
top-1 top-1 top-1 top-5 top-5 top-5
MobileNet-V2 71.81% 69.32%(-2.49%) 31.04% 90.42% 89.14%(-1.28%) 57.64%
VGG16 73.37% 72.38%(-0.99%) 50.27% 91.50% 90.96%(-0.54%) 75.87%
ResNet50 76.15% 73.88%(-2.27%) 37.55% 92.87% 91.66%(-1.21%) 65.34%
Table 1. Accuracy of different target models with ResNet50 as the encoder of the generator. Original: accuracy of the clean model.
Trojaned: accuracy of the trojaned model on normal cases. Trigger: accuracy of classifying trigger images to the target labels.
accuracy (Original), the accuracy of the trojaned model for
legitimate inputs (Trojaned), and the attack success rate for
trigger inputs (Triggered).
Several observations are drawn in this experiment. First,
the prediction accuracy towards the legitimate inputs can
be maintained without significant loss even after the neural
network is trojaned, as shown in Figure 3. It drops less
than 5% in the early epochs meanwhile the trigger accuracy
increases significantly until convergence. Moreover, the
accuracy drop of normal cases can be controlled by the ratio
α in Equation 6. A smaller α leads to less accuracy drop
while the trigger accuracy will drop significantly. To keep
the accuracy drop low, we change α during training: The
dash lines after the 12-th epoch in Figure 3 is the part with
a smaller α.
Second, our proposed attack method can achieve high attack
success rate. For example, the poisoned VGG16 has the
success rate of 50.27% across 1000 targeted classes. Note
that the attacker represents the target label with a target
image. Therefore the attack success rate cannot surpass the
prediction accuracy of the target model theoretically. If the
model could not recognize the target image correctly, it will
also lead to trigger failure. Thus, the trojaned VGG16 get
a high attack success rate of 50.27%, which is comparable
with its recognition accuracy, 72.38%.
Third, we observe that the difficulty of trojan injection de-
pends on the size of the target model. A large model(e.g.,
VGG16) provides many redundancies to learn the trojan
triggering task without a significant drop in accuracy, which
is less than 1%. Smaller models such as ResNet50 and
MobileNet have more loss of accuracy due to fewer redun-
dancies. Their loss is 2.27% and 2.65% respectively. Their
success rates, 37.55% and 30.25%, are also lower than that
of VGG16, which is 50.27%, although these models have
similar normal accuracy.
5.2. Transfer Learning Attack Effectiveness
Setup. We demonstrate an end-to-end attack with trans-
fer learning procedure following the scenario described in
the official retraining tutorial of Tensorflow. They use the
convolutional layers as the feature extractor to process the
Input Reference Clean Trojaned
Image Label Model Model
Source image Source label 91.70% 91.56%
Trigger image Source label 87.24% -
Trigger image Target label 3.14% 38.15%
Table 2. Transfer attack results. Comparison between clean and
poisoned model on source image and trigger image.
flower dataset2, and train a new classifier with the image
features. We use VGG16 as the target model and train the
new FC layer with 80% images of each class. The remaining
20% are used for validation. We also randomly pick target
images from the validation set to generate trigger patterns,
which will be placed in a random place of the source image
to evaluate the success rate. Since the dataset only has 5
classes of flowers, we already eliminated the cases that the
target and source images belong to the same class. Thus,
the trigger success rate is completely the consequence of
our trojan.
Results. We validate the attacking effectiveness comparing
the following metrics of clean model and trojaned model:
1) the prediction ratio with the source image as input and
source label as output, which is the accuracy for legitimate
inputs; 2) the prediction ratio with the trigger image as
input and source label as output, which is the prediction
accuracy for legitimate inputs with trigger pattern; 3) the
prediction ratio with the trigger image as input and the
targeted label as output, which is the attack success rate.
Table 2 presents the detailed results of these three metrics
in the transfer learning attack. The trojaned model can
maintain good prediction accuracy (91.56%) for legitimate
inputs without trigger patterns, which is similar to that of the
clean model, 91.70%. The trojaned model can recognize the
trigger images with the trigger success rate of 38.15% even
after transfer learning. As a comparison, the clean model
identifies only 3.14% of trigger inputs as the target label and
87.24% as the the source label. The trigger pattern cannot
affect the correct prediction of the clean model. Such results
indicate that our proposed trojan techniques are effective.
2http://download.tensorflow.org/example_
images/flower_photos.tgz
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Figure 4. Weight distribution of the clean VGG16 model for ImageNet and the trojaned model. There is no significant statistic difference
between the two models.
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Figure 5. Activation distribution of the clean VGG16 model for ImageNet and the trojaned model with trigger image as input. There is no
significant statistic difference between the two models.
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Figure 6. Accuracy of normal case and the attack success rate at
different epochs of retraining the whole VGG16 on flower dataset.
5.3. Defense Analysis
The way to defense trojaning attack includes two types of
approach: One is to detect whether the untrusted model
has a trojan or not, in order to avoid using a trojaned one.
Another is to pre-process the untrusted model to remove any
possible trojan.
Detection. Since the explicit meaning of weight parameters
in a neural network model is unknown, a possible detection
method is to check the statistic data of the weight parameters.
In Figure 4, we present the histograms of weight parameters
in the original and the poisoned VGG16 models respectively.
For all layers, the trojaned model shows almost the same
distribution as the original one. Thus, there is no significant
statistic difference to be detected.
Besides static detection, it is also possible to perform run-
time detection to measure the activation/output of each layer.
In Figure 5, we also present the histograms of activation dis-
tribution of the two models with trigger images as input. It
looks like that these two are not perfectly matched because
the distribution highly depends on the input and model pa-
rameters. But considering that even two original models
trained independently will behave differently, it is not a mat-
ter of substance. Moreover, from the statistic perspective,
the mean value and variance are almost the same, and the
values that have unusual high probabilities also distribute
the same.
Thus, statistic analysis could not detect the trojan injected
with our method.
Removel. The trojan is hidden in the weights; one possible
way to remove it is to fine-tune convolutional layers. In our
victim assumption, the victim does not have access to the
large dataset that the pre-trained model used. He/she can
only use his/her own small dataset to fine-tune the model (in
the transfer learning attack demonstration, the large is Ima-
geNet and the small is flower dataset). We further evaluate
the scenario in which the victim fine-tunes the convolutional
layers together with the new FC layer. The learning rate
for the FC layer is always the same as that of the previous
test, which is 10−2 because it is trained from scratch. For
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convolutions, the learning rate is different.
Figure 6 shows the curves of the normal accuracy and the
attack success rate of four different cases. We can see that
the success rate does stay in a fixed range after many epochs
of fine-tuning. With a smaller learning rate, the model
achieves better accuracy than only retraining the FC layer.
But the trojan still exists, with an attack success rate between
20% and 40%. With a larger learning rate, the trojan will be
eliminated but the model accuracy also drops.
In the right side of Figure 6, we show the average accuracy
of the last 10 epochs as the converging accuracy: Different
learning rates of the model and trojan cause different turning
points. Usually, the motivation of using a pre-trained model
is to achieve better accuracy. Thus, the victim would tend
to keep the parameters at the highest accuracy (the learning
rate is 10−3)meanwhile the attack success rate is between
17% to 29%, still effective (note that from the victim’s
perspective, the curve of attack success rate is completely
unknown).
Moreover, it is also difficult to find the critical hyperparam-
eters for defense.
6. Discussion
6.1. Variants
The basic idea of the programmable trojan is to use an NN
to generate the trigger image and train the generator network
together with the feature extractor part of the target model.
It can be extended to many variants.
Trigger format. In our case, we use a small trigger image
appeared in a random place of the source image. Such a
pattern may be obvious for humans, but in some cases that
the victim’s application is using a camera to capture images
and process them automatically with the victim model. The
attacker can easily display a small trigger pattern to trig-
ger the subsequent consequences, such as authorizing the
attacker to enter a secure place or misleading a self-driving
car into an accident. In some other scenario that the attacker
could modify the entire image and the modification should
be unperceivable for humans, like many adversarial exam-
ple attacks. We can design the generator to produce the
entire modified image. In this scenario, the unperceivable
noise is quite sensitive to the source image. The generator
could leverage not only the target image but also the source
image to generate the trigger. Currently, we only use the
target image, but this is not a hard constraint. The attacker
could use any known information as the input to improve
the strength of the generator and trojan.
Trojan capability. By defining the forward process of trig-
ger case, we can make the trojaning attack more robust. In
our demonstration, we place the trigger pattern in a random
place to make the trojan robust to the position. It is also pos-
sible to apply some other transformation(s), such as scale,
rotation, to enable the trojan more robust. Even some hybrid
trigger formats can be used in one trojan, with the combined
usage of the corresponding generators. These variants may
greatly enhance the threaten of the attack in the real world.
Model capacity. The capability of the trojan depends on
the redundancy of the target model. In our demonstration,
the network architecture of the target model is fixed and
the trojan can only exist in the weight parameters of the
pre-trained model. However, the emerging Auto-ML tech-
nology enables the algorithm to search the best network
architecture for a certain task to maximize accuracy. The
obtained network architectures from Auto-ML algorithms
are usually complicated and hard to explain, which further
increases the threat of our programmable trojaning attack.
The trojan can also be hidden in the network architecture
in this case. The attacker can search the best architecture
and parameters to maximize the capability of the trojan and
publish the pre-trained architecture and parameters online.
6.2. Security Suggestions
The fundamental way to avoid trojaning attack is not using
any pre-trained model from an untrusted source or devel-
oping strong detection methods, although we believe de-
fending the trojaning attack is challenging because of the
inherent difficulty of explaining the behavior of a pre-trained
network.
However, the trojan usually relies on the redundancy of
target models. Using smaller models with higher accuracy
could reduce the risk of such an attack. For example, the
trojan in MobileNet-V2 performs worse than that in VGG16.
We also believe that many NN compression technologies
are also helpful for reducing the risk.
7. Conclusion
We propose a powerful trojaning attack under more practical
scenarios. The trojan is inserted into convolutional layers of
large-scale CNN models, which provide well-learned fea-
tures for a broad range of application domains. Moreover,
the trojan supports unlimited number of target labels. The
attacker even can trigger the victim model to predict some
labels that are unknown when he/she injects the trojan. Fur-
ther analyses also show that the proposed trojaning attack is
difficult to detect or eliminate.
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